1 U.S. antidumping penalties also require that imports cause 'material injury' to the domestic industry. The United States International Trade Commission determines whether the imports have caused material injury, and the United States Commerce Department determines whether the imports have been sold in the U.S. at less than fair value (LTFV). (Fair value is sometimes referred to as 'normal' value.) 2 One source for general information about U.S. antidumping enforcement is the U.S. Department of Commerce Antidumping Manual, 1998. There is a small, but growing literature on the implications of the U.S. antidumping laws for U.S. trade with other countries. (Examples are Blonigen and Park, 2004 , Blonigen and Haynes, 2002 , Staiger and Wolak, 1994 .) U.S. antidumping law makes it illegal for foreign firms to sell their products in the United States at prices below 'normal value'.
1 The economic literature discussing U.S. antidumping generally treats both the home and export prices as single values. But, in fact, the price of most products imported into the U.S. is not homogeneous. For much economic analysis, this dispersion/discrimination in the prices of most products would be a detail of modest importance.
But an interpretation of the U.S. antidumping laws, now being challenged at the World Trade Organization, has made the dispersion of U.S. prices of foreign goods a critical part of the U.S.
calculation of antidumping margins, and has made the U.S. antidumping laws more protectionist than is sometimes thought. This interpretation of U.S. antidumping law is called 'zeroing'. Using 'zeroing', U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) officials do not compare the average of price observations in the U.S. to 'normal value' to determine whether dumping has occurred. Instead, DOC officials treat all observations of sales in the U.S. at prices higher than 'normal value' as if they had occurred at normal value. The result of this truncation of the higher end of the distribution of U.S. price observations is to increase the antidumping margin significantly in the case of imported products whose prices in the U.S. are quite dispersed.
I.) Zeroing in the Calculation of U.S. Antidumping Margins
The assessment of U.S. antidumping duties is a complicated process, which will not be fully discussed here. 2 Essentially, though, assessment of an antidumping duty requires both a determination of 'material' injury to the domestic industry by imports (this is done by the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC)), and a finding that the imports in question have been sold below 'normal' value in the U.S. (This investigation is done by the U.S. Department of Commerce.) 5 In 'model' zeroing, which may be used in the calculation of initial antidumping margins, the DOC divides the product under investigation into a number of 'models'. The initial antidumping margin for the product under investigation is determined by averaging only the difference between export and home prices for models for which the export price average is below the home price average. After an investigation by the DOC and ITC, an antidumping duty may be imposed on a particular foreign firm. This firm will then need to post a bond equal to this duty when it imports the item into the United States. At the end of each year the duty is in effect, there is an administrative review. It is at this point that the true antidumping duty (the amount that must be paid by the foreign firm) is determined. If, during the review year, the foreign firm facing the duty has raised its export price to the U.S. so that it is no longer selling in the U.S. below 'normal' value, then its bond is fully refunded. If, on the other hand, the foreign firm has lowered its U.S. price during the review year (assuming its home price is constant) then the firm will not only forfeit its bond, but will be assessed an additional U.S. duty.
The U.S. practice of zeroing comes in two forms: 'model' zeroing which may be used in the original investigation stage, and 'simple' zeroing, which is used in annual administrative reviews.
6 Tirole, 1989, notes (p. 133 ) that "It is hard to come up with a satisfactory definition of price discrimination." Among the reasons for this is the fact that no two transactions are ever fully identical in all respects. Partly for this reason, and partly because the phrase 'price discrimination' has acquired a penumbra of connotations which I do not intend, I sometimes use the looser term 'price dispersion' to mean charging different prices to distinct, but roughly-similarly-situated customers.
7 The EU appears to have flirted briefly with zeroing in the 1990s. In 1998, India requested that the WTO determine that the EU had acted contrary to its WTO obligations in the case of an antidumping order against cotton-type bed linens from India. The Japanese Ball Bearing matter and the Mexican Stainless Steel matter will be discussed in a bit more detail below. These are probably the most important challenges to the U.S. practice of zeroing among the six listed in the 
IIB.) The Mexican Complaint Concerning Stainless Steel
Shortly after Japan's complaint about U.S. antidumping in the ball baring matter, the antidumping enforcement.
Suppose a foreign product is being sold in the U.S. by a foreign firm whose home price is $2. Further suppose that there are three observations of sales by this firm in the U.S., each for one unit of the product, one at $1, one at $2 and one at $3. Consider the calculation of the antidumping margins with and without zeroing. 8
Zeroing and the Antidumping Duty With and Without Zeroing
Charts 2 illustrates the relation between the antidumping duty with and without zeroing as the mean U.S. price changes for the simple case where normal value is 1.0, and U.S. price observations are uniformly distributed with a range of one. Chart 1 shows the relation between the mean U.S. price and the 'mean U.S. price with zeroing' under the same assumptions.
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With normal value of one, and U.S. price observations distributed uniformly with a range of one about a mean U.S. price of 0.5, all observations of U.S. price are below Normal Value (which is one). In this case, Chart 1 shows that the average U.S. price with or without zeroing is 0.5.
Zeroing makes no difference, in this case, because all U.S. price observations are below normal value. Chart 2 shows that in this case, the antidumping duty with or without zeroing is 0.5 (50%).
Suppose the normal value is again one, and the U.S. price observations are again distributed uniformly with range one, but this time about a mean U.S. price of one. In this case, zeroing does make a difference. Since the mean U.S. price is the same as the normal value (one), there is no dumping if zeroing is not used. Chart 1 shows that in this case, when the mean U.S. price is one without zeroing, the average or the U.S. price observations with zeroing is 0.875. This is because half the U.S. price observations (all the ones over one) are treated as if they were one. The other half of U.S. price observations, uniformly distributed from 0.5 to 1.0 have an average of 0.75. Chart 2
shows that in this case, the antidumping margin without zeroing is zero, and with zeroing is 0.125 (because normal value is 1.0 and the average of the U.S. price observations with zeroing is 0.875.)
The observations on the right hand side of Chart 2, representing larger antidumping duties without zeroing, show the antidumping duties under the two approaches becoming almost equal for large antidumping duties. (The graph asymptotically approaches an a 45 degree ray from the origin.)
This occurs because higher antidumping duties without zeroing imply that the mean U.S. price is declining relative to the mean foreign price (the normal value.) As this occurs, the antidumping duties with and without zeroing resemble each other more closely, since (with a given dispersion of U.S. price observations) more of the U.S. price observations will be shifted into the dumped range 13 The fact that the antidumping duties in Chart 3 approach an asymptote of 1/3 (=33% antidumping duty) occurs because of the uniform distribution of US. prices and the restriction that no U.S. price observation can be less than zero.
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(less than normal value). 
IIIC.) Calculating Antidumping Margins

V.) Evidence of the Extent of Price Discrimination or Price Dispersion in U.S. Imports
Section III above suggests why the level of U.S. antidumping duties with zeroing depends crucially on the extent of price dispersion in U.S. import prices of the relevant products. There is a surprising lack of empirical literature about the extent of price discrimination/dispersion generally, and a near total lack of empirical work about price discrimination in the context of U.S. import prices.
The WTO complaint of the Japanese Machine Tool builders may be the best source in this regard, but several other studies are cited below.
V A.) The Extent of Dispersion of U.S. Import Prices Implied by the Data in the WTO
Complaint by the Japanese Machine Tool Builders
As discussed above, Chart 4 shows calculations by the Japanese Machine Tool Builders for 21 types of ball bearings of both the historical U.S. antidumping duty (using zeroing), as well as an estimate of what the U.S. antidumping duty would have been, had the U.S. zeroing methodology not been used. Clearly, the difference between the estimates in each of these twenty one pairs (the historical estimate in which zeroing was used and the counterfactual estimate in which it was not) was largely due to the dispersion of price observations for sales in the U.S. 15 Using these twenty one pairs of estimates, it is possible to make a rough inference about the extent of dispersion in the prices at which these Japanese bearings were sold in the U.S.
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I decided to make the simplest possible assumption about the distribution of U.S. prices charged by the Japanese exporter that would generate each pair of observations (antidumping duty with and without zeroing) for each product. I assumed that each pair of observations (a dumping duty with and without zeroing) were generated by only two distinct sales of the product in the United
States, and that these sales were of equal dollar value. In addition, I assumed that these two observations were drawn from a probability density function characterized by a uniform distribution.
Using these assumptions, an estimate for the coefficient of variation of each observation was generated (using the antidumping duty without zeroing as the mean). Finally, the arithmetic average of the 21 coefficients of variation computed in this way was determined. 16 The average of these 21 coefficients of variation was 0.18.
V B.) The Extent of Dispersion of U.S. Import Prices Implied by A Recent Study of Price Discrimination in German Exports
The price-to-market international trade literature may also shed indirect light on the extent to which individual foreign firms price discriminate in the sale of a given products sold to the U.S.
The price-to-market literature generally investigates the extent to which exporters discriminate in price with regard to export sales to different countries. One goal of these investigations is to learn about the effect of exchange rate movements on export prices. But the literature also has implications for the extent of international price discrimination. Of course, this literature is not perfectly aligned with the present goal, since it examines, for example, the export price (in marks) of cars that are made in Germany and sold in the United States versus the same cars made in Germany and sold in Australia. But the implications of this literature may still be of some interest from the current perspective. Examples are Knetter, 1989 , Gagnon and Knetter, 1992 , and Knetter, 1993 .
The first of the three papers cited is a very interesting study by Michael Knetter of price discrimination by U.S. and German exporters across export markets. [Knetter, 1989] Ten German export products are studied, and estimates of the effect of exchange rate changes in a number of 17 Data in the Knetter study covers German exports of each of the ten products to between five and eight destination markets.
18 I omitted four of the ten German export products in the Knetter study because the relevant mean of the export prices would have been so small that the interpretation of the coefficient of variation would have been difficult.
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destination markets on the price (in marks) of these exports are made. 17 Using Knetter's estimates, it is possible to infer the extent of price discrimination for these products across destination country markets. As noted, this is not precisely the sort of price discrimination under study in the present paper. Knetter's results examine price discrimination across countries, rather than across individual customers in a given country, which is the goal here.
For six of the ten German export products studied by Knetter-fan belts, titanium dioxide pigment, small cars, beer, white wine, and sparkling wine-I computed the coefficient of variation of the exports, treating each country destination as an equal-volume single export transaction. 18 Using this rough approach on these data results in a average coefficient of variation of German export price for these products of 1.15. The fact that this coefficient of variation is much larger than the coefficient reported in the case of the Japanese Machine Tool Builders case is not surprising. Price dispersion within a single country, as in the machine tool case, will almost always be substantially less than dispersion across countries, where arbitrage is difficult, and where different exchange rates can play a role.
V C.) The Extent of Dispersion of U.S. Import Prices Suggested by a Study of of Price Dispersion In Homogeneous Retail Products In Israel: The Lach Study
The most unlikely environment for finding an example of price dispersion would be the price of a homogeneous product in a single geographic region. If significant price dispersion can exist under these circumstances, then one might suspect such dispersion could be quite high in settings such as the price of imported goods subject to antidumping duties. Theorists have pointed out that if the price of a homogeneous product is to remain dispersed over time, it must be because consumers cannot easily learn which store is selling the good for the lowest price. [For example, see Varian, 1980] . But how often does this occur? In one of the very few available studies, Lach examined the 19 The refrigerator, the coffee and the flour were exactly the same in terms of physical attributes in this study. 20 Lach found that the position of individual stores in the rankings of relative prices changed enough over the months reported that it was plausible that customers could not readily determine where to get the lowest price. Because the Lach study examined homogeneous products within a fairly narrow geographic market, it probably sets a lower bound for the variation of transactions prices that may be expected for import prices.
VI.) How Much Does Zeroing Increase U.S. Antidumping Duties? VI A.) The Historical Dispersion of U.S. Import Prices
The arithmetical exercise presented in Section III above and illustrated in Charts 1 and 2
shows that the use of zeroing by the U.S. can be expected to increase calculated antidumping margins A larger dispersion of prices implies (other things equal) a larger difference between the duty computed with and without zeroing.
In Section V above, a rough inference of the relevant price dispersion is attempted using the complaint of the Japanese machine tool builders, as well as the price-to-market literature, such as the Several justifications of antidumping laws have been offered-protection from foreign predation, and exploitation of optimal tariff opportunities chief among them. But many observers 24 Although predation is a possibility, many observers have doubts about its frequency-see, for example, Kobayashi (forthcoming.) And even if foreign predation were a significant threat, regulations such as the antidumping laws might be a very expensive way to combat it, because duties might be imposed in cases where no predation was occurring. The optimal tariff argument is that a large country such as the U.S. should take advantage of any monopsony power it has in the purchase of imports. Again, it is unclear that antidumping regulations are a sensible way of exploiting any such power.
25 Studies such as those of Galloway, Blonigen and Flynn take the gains of U.S. firms benefitting from import protection into account. But these studies generally find the losses to U.S. consumers to be larger than the gains.
26 U.S. antidumping duties are far more numerous than U.S. countervailing duties, so I believe it is very likely that antidumping duties account for far more than half the totals cited in the study by Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn. But data summarizing the volume of imports covered by antidumping duties could not easily be located.
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remain convinced that these duties should be viewed as simple import protection. 24 A study by [Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn, 1999] If antidumping duties were half of all these duties and were the same average size as countervailing duties, then antidumping duties covered U.S.
imports of around $12 billion with a welfare cost of almost $ 2 billion. The Japanese machine tool builders complaint is the only estimates of the dispersion of U.S.
import prices that is actually derived from a set of such prices. As such, it may be the most accurate of the three estimates. Price dispersion in the Japanese machine tool builders case-obtained above on the assumption that the distribution of the import prices is uniform-had a coefficient of variation of 0.18. This is larger than the estimate from the Lach study, but, as expected, much smaller than the cross-country estimate from the price-to-market studies. The coefficient of variation discussed above from the ball bearing case-0.18-suggests that zeroing might account for about 3.7 percentage points of the average U.S. dumping duty of about 47.6%. If this is accurate, then the annual welfare cost of zeroing to the U.S. might be a bit above $150 million/year in this case. And, or course, if the dispersion of import prices approaches the range in the price-to-market studies, then the cost of zeroing could be far higher. 
